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Abstract 
How does concern for consumption relative to others (”relativity”) affect the progressivity of 
the optimal income tax structure? In this paper we revisit this literature and present a more detailed 
analysis of the solution to the non-linear income tax problem with consumption interdependence 
than is currently available, generalizing some results and developing other results for cases with 
special objective functions and special distributions, as well as numerical simulations. Of particular 
interest for us is the interplay between inequality and relativity in determining the optimal tax 
schedule. We find support for greater progressivity in the tax structure as relative concern increases. 
But our numerical calculations show that this incremental impact is less at higher levels of 
inequality. We also explore what happens when the government does not accept the relative 
concerns of individuals and maximizes a non-welfarist objective function. 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Andrew Oswald and participants at the SIRE – Cornell  conference on Relativity, Inequality and 
Public Policy  Edinburgh, 2009 for very useful comments and suggestions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is growing empirical evidence that the assumption that individual preferences are 
independent, in the sense that people do not want things because others want them, may not be 
entirely appropriate.2 The major alternative to this assumption is that an individual’s well-being 
depends on his or her relative consumption – how it compares to the consumption of others.  This 
“relativity” idea is not new of course. More than one hundred years ago Thorsten Veblen3 
maintained that consumption is motivated by a desire for social standing as well as for enjoyment of 
the goods and services per se. This implies that people compare consumption not leisure.4  
 
Relative consumption (income) concern or status seeking creates negative externalities because 
gains in one’s status reduce someone else’s. If these externalities are important as empirical 
research seems to suggest, taxing consumption externalities might be welfare enhancing just in the 
same way as any other Pigouvian tax. This simple intuition does not tell us anything about the 
detailed effects of relative income concern on the tax schedule. Do status considerations lead to a 
more progressive tax system or a less progressive tax system? Is income tax an effective tool for 
reducing inequalities and attenuating possible externalities arising from relative income concerns? 
How does inequality and relativity together determine the shape of the optimal tax schedule? 
 
There are few papers asking these questions in an optimal nonlinear income tax framework inspired 
by Mirrlees (1971)5--see Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990), Ireland (2001)6. In this paper we revisit 
these questions and extend the earlier work in the literature. We present a more detailed analysis of 
the solution to the non-linear income tax problem with consumption interdependence, including 
cases with special objective functions and special distributions, as well as numerical simulations. Of 
particular interest for us is the interplay between inequality and relativity in determining the optimal 
tax schedule. 
                                                 
2 Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) provide a good survey. 
3 Later on Duesenberry (1949), Galbraith (1958), Hirsch (1976) and Frank (1985, 1997) among others have written 
about the importance of relative position as a dominant spending motivation. 
4 More recent empirical research findings show that relative consumption concerns have important effects on 
consumption but little, if any, on leisure (Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
5 Aronsson-Johansson-Stenman (2008) address public good provision in this framework. 
6 Boskin-Sheshinski (1978) and Blomquist (1993) consider linear income tax policy with relative consumption. Bowles 
and Park (2005) consider a simple two-class tax model. Their model takes each individual’s reference consumption to 
be exogenous.  
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the optimal income tax model with relative 
consumption concern. In Section 3 we consider implications of relative concern in the optimal 
nonlinear income tax model with Rawlsian and Rank-order social objectives and with special 
distributional assumptions on preferences. Section 4 presents numerical simulations in the 
Utilitarian case. Section 5 elaborates on the interplay between relativity and inequality in 
determining optimal tax rates. Section 6  explores what happens when the government does not 
accept the relative concerns of individuals and maximizes a non-welfarist objective function. 
Section 7 discusses and concludes the results in the broader context of optimal taxation and 
behavioural public economics. 
 
2. Optimal non linear taxation and relative consumption concern 
 
Do people make comparisons between or among individuals of similar incomes? Or is the lifestyle of 
the upper middle class and the rich a more salient point of reference for people throughout the income 
distribution? A comparison consumption level can be constructed as follows. Let x denote 
consumption, and let 
 
                                                                                              (1) ( ) ( ) ( )n x n f n dnμ ω= ∫
 
where a distribution of wages (productivities), denoted by n, on the interval (0,∞) is represented by the 
density function f(n). There are a number of alternative interpretations of the variable μ. The simplest 
one is obtained if each of the ω weight is equal to one. In this case the average consumption is the 
comparison consumption level. We can choose the weights ω so that μ is the consumption of the 
richest individual (this corresponds to Veblen’s idea), of the median individual or something in 
between the richest and the median.  It is difficult to say without empirical evidence which is the most 
plausible interpretation. Moreover, as Layard (1980) suggests, that people may have different μ values. 
In this paper, we restrict attention to the case where ω=1 for all n so that μ is the average consumption 
of people in the economy. 
 
We consider a one period model with labour as the only source of income. There is a continuum of 
individuals, each having the same preference ordering, which is represented by an additive utility 
function  
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( ) ( ) ( )u U x V yψ μ= + −      (2) 
 
where x is a composite consumption good, μ is a comparison consumption level, and hours worked are 
y, with Ux > 0, ( )0μψ < >  and Vy < 0 (subscripts indicating partial derivatives) and where V(.)  is 
convex. As typical in optimal tax literature, we have to make simplifying assumption like this 
separability assumption to be able make progress in our understanding of the optimal schedules. 
Workers differ only in the pre-tax wage n they can earn. Gross income   
 
z ny=       (3) 
 
and consumption, x, is after-tax income. 
                                                                   
  Suppose that the aim of policy can be expressed as maximizing the following social welfare criterion 
                                                                                                   (4) 
0
( ( )) ( )S W u n f n d
∞
= ∫ n
                                                
where W(.) is an increasing and concave function of utility.  
 
We should note before moving on that there are many difficult problems with formulation of the social 
welfare function. For example, we must decide whether the government ought to accept relative 
income concerns in social welfare. This is closely related to the awkward question of whether we 
should include antisocial preferences such as envy, malice etc. in social welfare function or not. If so, it 
would be important to consider the case where the government is “non-welfarist” (paternalistic). 
But it could be argued that to the extent relative concerns or Veblen effects are real, it should be 
respected when evaluating social welfare.7 In this paper we follow the latter, “welfarist”, route. 
 
The government cannot observe individuals’ productivities and thus is restricted to setting taxes and 
transfers as a function only of earnings, . The government maximizes S subject to the revenue 
constraint 
( ( ))T z n
 
7 Examples of the first include Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994) and Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004), while O’Donoghue 
and Rabin (2003), Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and McCaffery and Slemrod (2006) are examples of the latter. See 
Seade (1980) for seminal work. 
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0
( ( )) ( )T z n f n dn R
∞
=∫                                                                                                     (5) 
where in the Mirrlees tradition R is interpreted as the required revenue for essential public goods. The 
Totally differentiating utility with respect to , and making use of workers utility maximization 
n the incentive c
 
                               
more non-tax revenue a government receives from external sources, the lower is R. 
           
n
condition, we obtai ompatibility constraints, 
yyVdu   g
dn n
= − = .                                                                              (6) 
     
Since T ny x= − , we can think of government as choosing schedules )(nx , )(ny  and μ. In fact it is 
easier to think of it choosing a pair of functions, )(nu , )(ny  and μ, which maximize welfare index (4) 
subject to the revenue requirement (5), the incentive compatibility condition (6) and the comparison 
condition (1). We focus on the case where ω=1 
8               
  
for all n so that μ is the average consumption of people 
in the economy. Introducing Lagrange multipliers λ, α(n) and γ  for the constraints (5), (6) and (1) and 
tegrating by parts, the Lagrangean becomes in
0
[( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) ' ] ( ) ( ) (0) (0)L W u ny x f n xf u g dn u uλ γ μ α α α α∞= + − + − − − + ∞ ∞ −∫  (7) 
Differentiating with respect to u, y and μ gives the first-order conditions9  
 
 
 
                [ ' (L W h )] ( ) '( ) 0u u f n nλ γ α= − + − =                                                                            (8) 
                                                
                  ) 0yyyV( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(y y y yL n h f n h f n n Vλ γ α= − − + + =                                                    (9) 
                    
                                                 
    8 The 1.order condition of individual’s optimisation problem is only a necessary condition for the individual's choice to 
be optimal, but we assume here that it is sufficient as well. Assumptions that assure sufficiency are provided by Mirrlees 
(1976). Note also that while we here presume an internal solution for y, (6) remains valid even if individuals were 
bunched at y=0 since, for them, . / 0du dn =
9 Inverting utility we have ( , , )x h u y μ=
, /xU hμ μ
 and calculating  the derivatives        
/ , 1/y y x xh V U h Uxψ= − = = −  
 6
                                                                                       (10) 
 
(10) implies   
( ) ( ) 0L h f n dn h f n dnμλ γ γ= − + − =∫ ∫μ μ
( )
1 ( )h f n dnμλ − ∫
h f n dnμγ = ∫                                                                                                   (11) 
 
 the transversality conditions  
 
        
(8) satisfies
 (0) 0; ( ) 0
(0) ( )
L L
u u
α α∂ ∂= = = ∞ =∂ ∂ ∞                                                                                                                
and 
               0)( >nμ , for  (0, )n∈ ∞ ,                                                                                    
Integrating in (8)10 
                   ( )( ) [ ' ] ( )n W f pλ γα
∞ += −
xn u
∫ dp                                                                                          (12) 
                                                              
From the first order conditions of government’s maximization, we obtain the following condition 
for optimal marginal tax rate ; [Note: ( ) '( )t z T z= 1 1 1
1 1
x
Y
U nt
t t V
= − = −− −  ] 
 
                                ( )( ) [ '] ( )
1 ( )
x
xn
Ut W f p dp
t nf n U
γ λ γζλ λ
∞ += + −− ∫                                                   (13)                
 
where 1 yy
y
yV
V
ζ = + . 
orth noting that the so called end-point results do not hold any more. From (13) and the 
transversality conditions ( ) ( ) 0o
It is w
α α= ∞ =  the marginal tax rates are positive at the both ends when 
                                                 
10 Integrating in (8)  
               
0
( ) (0)
n d dn n
dn
α α α= −∫  
 7
0μψ <  (see Oswald, 1983). This is also true with other comparators. Going beyond average 
consumption. As shown in Tuomala (1990) the separability assumption used in Oswald (1983) can 
ened so that μ affects individuals’ choices. Unfortunately we are not able to say more on the 
lying and dividing (13) by we can to write the formula for marginal rates;                         
                                                                                                                    
be weak
Multip
shape of tax schedule with the weaker separability condition.  
 
(1 ( ))F n−
[ ]
( )
( )
' (1 / )[1 ] ( )
1 ( ) (1 / )1
1 ( ) (1 ( ))c
n n
p
x
x pu
xn
W UU f p dp
F n Ut E
t nf n F nE
γ λ
λ γ λγ
λ
∞⎡ ⎤+−⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− +⎡ ⎤+ ⎢ ⎥= + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −
nC
	

where  uE  is the uncompensated supply of labour and cE  in turn is the compensated elasticity.11 
The first term on the right hand side of (14) for the marginal income tax rate is analogous to a 
Pigouvian tax correcting for an externality. It could also be called a first-best motive for taxation, as 
it corrects the individual activity to correspond to social preferences. From (14), there are in 
addition to the externality term three elements on the right hand side of (14) that determine optimum 
tax rates: elasticity and income effects (A&C), the shape of the skill distribution (B&C) and social 
marginal weights (C). B is a measure of relative the size of the taxpayers at that level and abo
A B
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫
                        (14)                              
ve it. The 
 moderate. 
n the basis of (14) we can also  notice that if the utility of individuals depends negatively on the 
incom
plifying assumptions. The terms in (14) simplify if we 
                                                
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
	
	

C-term in (6) is a measure of the social cost of taking an euro away from everyone above that skill. C 
tends to favour rising marginal rates. Especially this  is so  when income is low or
O
comparison consumption the marginal tax rate of the highest income is positive.  
 
It should however be clear from (14) that the variation of the optimal marginal tax rate with the 
level of income is a complex matter.  It is clear that explicit solutions to the optimal e tax 
problem are difficult to obtain without sim
 
11Differentiating the FOC  of the individual maximization, (1 ) 0x yU n t V− + = ,  with respect to net wage, labour 
supply and virtual income, ,  we have after some manipulation elasticity formulas; b
xxxyyy
xxxyyu
UUVV
UUVyV
E
2
2
)/(
)/()/(
+
−=   , 
(income effect parameter)   
xxxyyy
xxxy
UUVV
UUV
I 2
2
)/(
)/(
+
−=     ,  and from the Slutsky equation  IEE uc −= , then  
xxxyyy
yc
UUVV
yV
E 2)/(
)/(
+= .     
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1xU =assume, as in Atkinson (1995) and Diamond (1998), quasi-linear preferences with . The 
marginal tax rate formula then reduces to: 
 
[ ]
'[1 ](1 / ) ( )
1 ( ) (1 / )11
1 ( ) (1 ( ))c
n
n
nC
n
A B
W f p dp
F nt
t nf n F nE
γ λλ γ λγ
λ
∞⎡ ⎤− +⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− +⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥= + + ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥
∫
	
	

                                          (15) 
 
 different influences in play, to allow useful 
terpretation. We turn therefore to further assumptions, on the government’s objective function and 
rovide further insights. 
3. Quasi linear preferences 
3
If we assume the Rawlsian social objective12 then the factor Cn in (14) is constant. Then the pattern 
of marginal tax rates depends only on
 
⎣ ⎦	

But this is still too complex, with a number of
in
on the distribution of n, to p
 
.1.The Rawlsian case  
 
 B, that is, on the shape of the n-distribution:  
N
1 1 ( )1 (1 )
1 ( )
n n
c
A B
t E nf n
nC
t F nγ γ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦	
	

We specify further the case with a maximin criterion so that the upper part of the n-distribution is the 
unbounded Pareto distribution,
                                                                                        (16) 
 1
11
u x x y εϕ += − −  1( ) af n n +=  for a>0, and the utility function is 
C uE E ε= = ) Then  using (11) we have (
 
1 11 [1 ]t
a1 t
φ φ⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                                                                                          (17) 
 
                                                
ε−
 
12 Maximizing utility of worst off person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1972). It is a kind of 
welfarist version of Rawlsian. “To interpret the difference principle as the principle of maximin utility (the principle to 
maximize the well-being of the least advantaged person) is a serious misunderstanding from a philosophical 
standpoint.” Rawls,1982) 
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where 
1
ϕφ ϕ= − . 
 
Hence using the Rawlsian social welfare function we do not obtain the rising part of the U-shaped 
marginal tax rates as in Diamond (1998).13  
 
Proposition 1.  The optimal top marginal tax rate depends negatively on a, which is a measure of the 
  
Table 1 shows how the top marginal tax rate decreases when the elasticity of labour supply є 
 
 of wages is an unbounded Pareto distribution, then optimal marginal tax 
rates are constant and positive. This implies that the optimal tax function is linear 
thinness of the tail of the Pareto distribution, and it is decreasing in є. Finally, it is increasing in φ, 
which measures the importance of relativity in this framework. 
We illustrate numerically marginal rates in the following tables. The table 1 presents the marginal tax 
rates for parameter value when a=2 and 3, φ =0 and 1/2 and є=1/3, ½ and 1.  
                                
increases, the Pareto parameter a increases and the degree of relative consumption concern declines. 
The results in Table 1 depend on the chosen distribution of wages.  
If the whole distribution
( )T z k zτ= +                                                                                                                               (18) 
The average tax rate is  
( )T z k t
z z
                                                                                                                                (19) 
where 
= +
1
bt
b
= +  is between zero and one and where
1 11 [1 ]b
a
φ φε
⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
Equation (19) implies that average tax rates are increasing if and only if k is negative. If preferences 
are quasi-linear in consumption and the distribution of n is an unbounded Pareto distribution, a maxi-
in criterion implies increasing average tax rates in income. When the elasticity of labour supply is 
ot constant, the problem becomes more complicated. Then it is not possible without simulations to 
 
                                                
m
n
say anything about the shape of tax schedule. 
 
 
13 In the general additive case with maximin, C   is ( ( ) / )xf p U dp∫ . It is declining with n since u(x) is concave and 
the intergral term declines in n. This might suggest declining marginal rates. 
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We now consider two alternatives to the Pareto distribution: (i)  the Champernowne (1952) 
distribution and (ii) the lognormal distribution (with parameters m and σ (see Aitchison and Brown, 
1957)14). As is well known, the lognormal distribution fits reasonable well over a large part of income 
range but diverges markedly at the both tails. The Pareto distribution in turn fits well at the upper tail. 
Champernowne (1952) proposes a model in which individual incomes ARE assumed to follow a 
random walk in the logarithmic scale. Here we use the two parameter version of the Champernowne 
distribution. This distribution approaches asymptotically a form of Pareto distribution for large values 
of wages but it also has an interior maximum.  As for the lognormal, the Champernowne distribution 
xhibits the following features: asymmetry, a left humpback and long right-hand tail; but it has a 
 
The probability density function of
 
e
thicker upper tail than in the lognormal case.  
 the Champernowne distribution is 
1
   2( ) ( )( )m nθ θ+                                                                                                              (20)              
 
m nf n
θ θ
θ
−
=            
 which   θ  is a shape parameter and m is  a scale parameter. The cumulative distribution function 
 
 
in
is 
 ( ) 1
( )
mF n
m n
θ
θ θ= − +                                                                                                             (21)                           
 
  
 
For the distribution ratio: 
1 ( ) 1lim lim    
( )n nnf n nθ
F n m nθ θ
θ θ→∞ →∞
 
− += → .                                                                            (22)                      
distribution for large values of wages. 
                                                
Eq (22) confirms that the Champernowne distribution approaches asymptotically a form of Pareto 
 
14 2( ; , )Ln n m σ  with support [0,∞). The first parameter m is log of the median and the second parameter is the 
variance of log wage. The latter one is itself an inequality measure. 
 11
Calculating the inverse hazard ratio or Mills ratio 1 ( )F n
( )nf n
−  for Champernowne distribution (with 
different parameter values of θ= 2 and 3 and m=e-1) and lognormal distribution (with different 
nfirm that zero is a poor 
pproximation even for the top 0.1 per cent. Finally and most importantly from our point of view, as 
oncern increases, (i) marginal tax rates increase throughout, (ii) 
lt that the fall off of marginal tax 
                                                         
                                                                                                                                                             
The Rawlsian objective embodies extr
aim of 
                  
, declines according to the ranking in the n-distribution. 
his is in effect the weighting underlying the Gini coefficient, as shown by Sen (1974) who provided 
an axiomatic justification for such a social welfare function. The social marginal valuation declines 
 twice the average for the lowest paid taxpayer to  
to infinity. The marginal tax rate formula is 
parameter values of σ= 0.39 and 0.7 and  m=e-1,see Figure 1a an b) we obtain from (16) the marginal 
tax rates with the Rawlsian case. The results are shown for different percentile points of the 
distribution. 
  
Note that these (in Tables 1, 2 and 3) are marginal rates for all taxes that vary with income, and 
should be compared with the schedules for total of taxes on income and expenditures in real 
economies. From Tables 2 and 3 we can see that the marginal tax rates decrease with labor supply 
elasticities as expected. We also see that marginal tax rates are throughout much lower for lognormal 
case than for the Champernowne distribution. In other words the choice of the  functional form of the 
n-distribution matters greatly. The results in Tables 2 and 3 again co
a
the degree of relative consumption c
they increase more at higher levels of income and (iii) with the resu
rates is less steep, and in this sense the tax structure is more progressive.  
 
3.2 The Sen social welfare function 
                                                         
eme inequality aversion. What happens at more moderate levels of 
inequality aversion? Suppose that the policy can be expressed as maximizing the following rank 
dependent social welfare criterion 
       
0
2(1 ) ( ) ( )W F u n f n dn
∞
= −∫                                                                                                         (23)        
where the social marginal valuation, 2(1 )F−
T
linearly with F from  approach to zero when n goes
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N
1 1 ( )1 (1 ) ( )
1 ( )
nn n
c
CA B
t F n F n
t E nf n
γ γ
λ λ
⎡ ⎤−⎡ ⎤= + + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
rom (24) we see that when n tends to infinity the Rawlsian and rank order marginal tax rates 
es15 we see from (24) that the pattern of marginal tax 
rates depend at the same way on  the shape of n-distribution, є and φ.  So the proposition 1 holds for 
 made. How robust are these insights? What happens when we move away from quasi-
linearity? This section presents optimal tax schedules with alternative assumptions. Our simulations are 
performed for the strict utilitarian case16. For distribution, we assume that f(n) is lognormal density 
(m,σ) (mean, stand dev.)  We further m
	
	

                                                                (24) 
 
F
coincide. As with the Rawlsian social objectiv
this case, too. 
 
 4. The Utilitarian case with income effects 
 
The special cases considered in the previous section yield insights but within the framework of the 
assumptions
ove away from quasi-linearity and use the following utility 
function 
 
log log log(1 )xU x yϕ μ= + + −                                                                                           (25) 
                                                                                   
whereμ is the comparison consumption level, φ is a degree of relative income concern. Of course, the 
form  restricts the range of the elasticity of labor supply. It is important to note that (25) does 
ot o affect directly individuals utility levels but it also has behavioural effects, namely, relativity 
 in (25)
nly n
concerns (φ)  can change an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
labour supply. This can be seen from individuals utility maximization condition; 
/(1 )(1 ) 1x y tϕ+ − = − .  
 
                                                 
15 Maximizing utility of worst off person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1972). It is a kind of 
welfarist version of Rawlsian. “To interpret the difference principle as the principle of maximin utility (the principle to 
maximize the well-being of the least advantaged person) is a serious misunderstanding from a philosophical 
standpoint.” Rawls,1982) 
16 Through a utilitarian social welfare function with constant absolute utility-inequality aversion:     1( ) uW u e ββ
−= −                                                 
where β  measures the degree of inequality aversion (in the case of 0=β , we define uW = ). 
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The empirical research on relativity (status) also employs the log-linear specification as in (25) (see 
Clark et al 2008 eqs (2) and (4)). One of the key findings of this research is that the estimated 
coefficient on income (consumption) and income comparison are statistically almost equal and 
opposite. (see eg Clark and Oswald (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , Luttmer (2005)). This 
nding is robust to variety of controls and highly statistically significant. Thus, relative consumption fi
matters approximately as much as own consumption; an Euro of increased consumption increases 
utility about the same amount an Euro reduction in average consumption in the society. Hence 
relative income  is close a zero sum game. 
 
The optimal tax schedules are calculated numerically. The results of the simulations are summarized 
below in Tables 4-8. In these Tables, R (or X/Z) is revenue requirement (R=0 means pure 
redistributive system), ATR is average tax rate and MTR is marginal tax rate. The Tables give labour 
supply, y , gross income, z , net income, x    and optimal average (ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) 
at various percentiles of the ability distribution. The Tables also provide the decile ratio (P90/P10) 
((P90/P50)) for net income and gross income  and the ratio between the guaranteed income x(n0)17 
and median income. Since marginal tax rates may be a poor indication of the redistribution powers of 
an optimal tax structure we measure the extent of redistribution, denoted by RD, as the proportional 
s increase at all levels of 
income, (ii) the drop off in marginal tax rates for higher income levels is mitigated, and (iii) our 
re
se
fu
                                                
reduction between the decile ratio for market income, z, and the decile ratio for disposable income, x. 
Tables 4-8 give comparisons as  φ and σ vary. Figures 2 -6 show marginal tax rates for different 
parameters. 
 
Several patterns emerge from the simulations presented here, focusing specifically on the impact of 
relativity on progressivity. As the parameter φ increases, (i) marginal tax rate
distribution measure, RD, increases. The case for greater progressivity in the tax schedule, in these 
nses, comes through in the cases examined here—it is not just a property of the Rawlsian objective 
nction, nor restricted to the Pareto or the Champernowne distributions. 
 
To further examine how sensitive the shape of the tax schedule and working hours are to the choice 
of the parameter φ  in the utility function  and inherent inequality we computed solutions for φ=1.0 
and 3.0 in the case of the utility function  (25) and σ =0.5 and 0.7 in the lognormal distribution ( 
shown in Figures  3 -6) and  θ=2 and 3 in the Champernowne distribution (see Table 9 and 10).  We 
 
17 There is a critical n0 such that   for ( ) 0y n = 0n n≤   and    for . ( ) 0y n > 0n n>
 14
find that when φ and inherent inequality increase the marginal tax rates are higher and increasing 
with income up to around F(n)=0.99.  These results reinforce the findings of Kanbur - Tuomala 
(1994) that when higher values of inherent inequality are used optimal marginal tax rates increase 
with the income over the majority of the population. It turns out that when we increase φ, 
individuals above the median work more in order to retain their relative position. Individuals of low 
incomes in turn reduce labour supply when both φ  and σ increase. This is not surprising. Given that 
tive high marginal tax rates are timal near the bottom and the guaranteed incomes, x(n0), are 
higher, individuals of low income are unlikely to find work worthwhile. When we increase 
simultaneously both φ and σ,  then only 
rela op
those in the top decile increase working hours. To relate 
ese results to empirical labour supply studies we give the values of the uncompensated elasticity,  th
uE  and uncompensated elasticity uE 18. We have calculated different measures for the extent of 
redistribution. In Tables 4-11 we show our RD-measure and the ratio between the  guaranteed 
consumption and median consumption.    
 
The optimum is typically characterized by a certain fraction of individuals, at the bottom end, 
choosing not to work (where we have dx/dn=dz/dn=0, there is bunching of individuals of different 
n). This is because their productivity is insufficient (wage rate) to compensate for the lost leisure (or 
  
(no)=0.015. Our numerical results reveal that the amount of 
unching is quite sensitive to the greater inequality. When σ=0.7 and φ=1 (table 6) the amount of 
unching is 12 %, i,e, F(no)=0.12. When σ=0.5 (0.7) and φ=3 (table 8) the amount of bunching is 
% (22 %), i,e, F(no)=0.07 (=0.22). Hence the amount of bunching is very sensitive to the inherent 
equality and much less to relativity.  
                                                
non-employment activity) that working would entail. When φ is zero there is very little bunching 
(eg, in the case of Table 4 it turns out to be practically zero (F(no)=0.0003). With greater relativity 
concern bunching increases slightly 
In the case (σ=0.5 and φ=1 (table 4)) F
b
b
7
in
 
 
 
 
 
18  With the utility function (21) income effect is constant 
1
2
I ϕ= − + .  So the income effect is decreasing in φ. The 
compensated elasticity 
(1 )(1 )
(2 )
c yE
y
ϕ
ϕ
− += +  is decreasing with y. 
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5. Relativity and Inequality 
 
In this section we look at the interaction of inequality and the strength of relativity in determining 
the optimal tax schedule. We know that progressivity increases with greater relativity concern. 
(Figure 1). The greater relativity concern increases the marginal tax rates throughout and they 
increase more at the higher level of income. We also know, from Kanbur and Tuomala (1994), that 
progressivity increases with inequality (confirmed in Figure 2). To see how the impact of greater 
relativity affects progressivity at successively higher levels of pre-tax inequality, we have computed 
solutions for different parameter values of relative consumption concern φ given pre-tax inequality, 
and then repeated the exercise at a higher level of inequality.  From Figures 3 and 4 we see that the 
greater relativity increases progressivity but this impact is dampening with increasing inequality. 
Similarly, we can ask how the impact of greater inequality affects progressivity with greater 
strength of relativity.  From Figures 5 and 6 we see that the greater inequality increases 
progressivity but this impact on progressivity is in turn declining in an increase of relativity. Thus it 
seems that, in these numerical simulations at least, relativity and inequality do not compound each 
other’s incremental effect on progressivity. Further research is needed to understand the detailed 
nature of this result. 
Given the inherent complexities of optimal non-linear income taxation, it is not straightforward to 
develop an intuition for this result. But we can take the first steps towards understanding as follows. 
Suppose first the case with a fixed cake. If average consumption increases by one Euro, individuals’ 
utilities go down as average consumption goes up. Lowering taxes increase average consumption 
and consequently lower utility, other things equal. Hence marginal tax rates should be higher than 
otherwise. With the utility function (25) there is a simple relationship between λ and γ:γ ϕλ= . 
Hence we see from (14) that an increase in φ increases marginal rates in the first best case. This is 
also true in the second best case at the endpoints of the distribution. Otherwise things are more 
complicated in the second best world. Let us now focus on the C-term in (14). This term measures 
 slightly increasing the marginal tax rate at n and distributing as a poll 
The first term in the integrand tends to favour rising marginal rates. The higher n, the lower is W’, 
the lower would be the marginal utility of consumption, 
the social welfare gain from
subsidy to those below n the revenue raised from consequent increase in average tax rates above n. 
xU . Hence at higher n the average value of  
( ' / (1 / )) /(1 )xW U Fλ γ λ+ −   is smaller and the whole term 1 ' / (1 / )xW U λ γ λ− +  is larger. With the 
utility function (25) this term becomes 11 . So the di lativity concerns disappear. rect effects of re
xλ−
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Without simulations it is not possible say how greater relativity concern changes λx. On the other 
 As shown in 
n the term A20 it affects how elasticities vary 
ith skill. As shown by Chetty (2006) there is a relationship between risk aversion and the labour 
supply. Or to pu
and the ratio of income and wage elasticities.21  We can see this link by differentiating of the FOC of 
dividual’s problem and using  the Slutzky equation: 
hand an increase in pre-tax inequality affects λ, the marginal cost of public funds. Kanbur-Tuomala 
(1993) shows the complications that can arise in signing the C-term as a function of mean 
preserving spreads in the distribution of n. 
  
Finally, how are these relationships in turn affected by the elasticity of labor supply?
Tables 4-8 both compensated and uncompensated labour supply elasticities are decreasing with 
income in all cases displayed in Tables. At the upper part of the distribution the labour supply 
elasticities are declining with greater relativity and inequality. Unfortunately there is little empirical 
evidence regarding the relationship between labour supply elasticities and wage rates19.  
The income effects enter through the terms A and C. I
w
t it another way there is the connection between the curvature of the utility function 
in
 
x
xx
c U
nU
ny
by =∂∂
∂∂
/
/                                                                                                                      (26)                              
 
 where cy  is a compensated labour supply and b is virtual income.  As seen from (26) the curvature 
of the utility function with respect to consumption (the coefficient of relative risk aversion) is 
important because the labour supply response to an increase in income is related to how much the 
marginal utility of consumption changes as income changes.  If xxU  is large, the marginal utility of 
consumption falls sharply as income rises, so that the taxpayer will reduce labour supply when his 
                                                 
19 Röed and Ström (2002) (table 1 and 2) offer a review of the existing more recent evidence. They conclude that the limited 
evidence indicates that labour supply elasticities are declining with household income. Using Norwegian data Aaberge-
Colombino (2006) provides support for declining elasticities.  High labour supply elasticities among low-wage workers is 
also confirmed by empirical evaluations of various in-work benefit schemes operating in the US,  UK and some other 
countries. By contrast, there is empirical evidence on the elasticity of taxable income that higher elasticities are among high 
income individuals. See eg. Gruber-Saez (2002).    
 
20 The marginal utility of consumption, xU . and the term A in (14) has its origin in first order condition for labour supply 
(incentive compatibility condition). It shows the rate at which utility changes with n. The greater is xU  the more it 
changes as labour supply y is increased. 
 
21 See the formula (7) in Chetty (2006) 
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or her earnings rise. In fact this is the case here. We have assumed additively separable utility in 
comparison consumption (average consumption). This property rules out direct behavioural 
consequences in envy. But the utility function (25) does not abandon relativity effects on labour 
supply. The utility function (25) implies that xxU  is larger for low income people than high income 
people. Hence income effects make taxing less costly, encouraging labour supply for middle and 
upper income individuals, because taxes reduce after tax income, but make transfers more costly, 
discouraging labour supply for low-income individuals, because transfers increase after tax income. 
 Therefore, holding other things constant, income effects lead to higher marginal rates at the upper 
end of the income distribution, allowing the government to redistribute more, but make 
distribution at the low end more costly, and so the net effect on the level of transfers is 
ower the 
mpensated elasticity the higher the optim  income tax rate. This effect is increasing the 
s 
hould gain more from redistribution than otherwise, but higher income individuals should lose 
ll inequality 
e individuals should gain even more from redistribution, but again higher 
re
ambiguous. If income effects are spread evenly throughout the distribution as in our case, then 
numerical simulations show that income effects allow the government to increase the level of 
transfers paid for by higher marginal rates across the distribution. 
 
The labour supply is much smaller below the median income than without relativity concerns. In 
simulations those above median in turn seem to work harder. As noted in footnote 13 the income 
effect is decreasing in φ. Now we see from (14) that given other things constant the l
co al marginal
level of marginal rates throughout compared with the case without relativity considerations. Income 
effects may be the most important reason  why the greater inequality increases progressivity in the 
sense of increasing marginal rates but this impact  is declining in an increase of relativity.  
  
In sum: To the extent that preferences are more relative than absolute, lower income individual
s
more as well, so the net effect is ambiguous. Now holding the mean constant, if overa
increases, lower incom
earners should lose more, the net effect remains unclear. For these reasons simulations are needed. 
 
6. Government’s and individuals’ preferences differ: Non-welfarism vs welfarism 
 
It is not necessarily clear that the government ought to accept relative income concerns when 
forming its social objectives. The utility function governing individuals’ long-term welfare may be 
different from that of their short-term welfare. Perhaps a stronger case for paternalism could be built 
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on the idea that the government is not willing to accept the consequences of relative income 
concerns. In other words market behavior is generated by one set of preferences, but  society 
evaluates it with respect to another set of preferences. In many respects, the situation described 
above is fairly common in welfare and normative public economics. Perhaps the most well-known 
example is the analysis of so-called merit goods (Sandmo 1983). The consumption of these goods, 
in the viewpoint of the government, is meritorious and should be encouraged or imposed, ignoring 
individual choice. Optimal taxation when the government attempts to alleviate poverty (e.g. Kanbur 
et al 1994a) is another application of a much larger literature on “non-welfarist” public economics, 
where the social planner explicitly uses some other criterion for evaluating an individual’s welfare 
an the preferences of that individual.  Perhaps at some level one could also argue that 
e assume now that the individual still maximises the same utility function (25) as in the previous 
 in the welfarist case up to the top decile of the income distribution. Above 
elow) the median hours worked are smaller (greater) in the non-welfarist case than in the welfarist 
at there is less redistribution in the non-welfarist case (RD=40%) than 
 the welfarist case (78%). The guaranteed income x(no) is smaller in the non-welfarist case than in 
th
redistribution – where the government can evaluate individual welfare in a different way than the 
individuals themselves – and correction of externalities are additional examples in which the social 
welfare function differs from the individual utility.  
 
 W
section, but the government’s objective function rules out relativity effects. For example, 
individuals might benefit if an outsider induced them to behave according to preferences they wish 
they had.  
 
Our numerical simulations show (Figures 8 and 9) that the marginal tax rates are higher  in the non-
welfarist case than
(b
case (Figure 10). We also find th
in
the welfarist case. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
  
As noted in the introduction, there are a few papers in the literature that have attempted to analyze 
the structure of optimal income taxation in the presence of relative concerns. How does our paper 
compare with these exercises? 
 
Boskin - Sheshinski (1978) construct an educational investment model in which the individual’s 
income is determined by his income and demonstrated that increased concern for relative 
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consumption in the optimal linear income tax leads to larger lump sum subsidies and higher tax 
rates. Oswald (1983) studies a more general optimal non-linear tax problem in a world in which 
there is altruism and envy. He takes the standard utility function as a function of consumption and 
leisure and adds a concern for consumption of others. He considers mainly the case where the 
omparison is average consumption (as we do here). Another simplifying assumption he makes is 
shaped marginal tax rate structure. This is also the case when we assume a 
lights the interplay of relativity and inequality in 
etermining the optimal structure of taxes. We also explored what happens when the government 
oes not accept the relative concerns of individuals and maximizes a non-welfarist objective 
urther explore this interaction between relativity and inequality 
at our numerical simulations have uncovered.  
c
that envy (or altruism) has no effect on consumption decision and labour supply. With these 
assumptions and using a ceteris paribus argument he reaches the conclusion "...optimal marginal tax 
rates are higher in a predominantly jealous world."   
 
Ireland (2001) incorporates a social status-signalling mechanism into the Mirrlees model. In a 
model where individuals signal status with consumption, e.g. large houses, cars, boats etc., he finds 
status seeking leads to higher marginal tax rates, but not a more progressive rate structure.  His 
results are based on quasi-linear preferences, unbounded Pareto distribution and utilitarian social 
welfare function. So he confirms Diamond's (1998) result  -  the U-shaped marginal tax rate 
structure - with the unbounded Pareto distribution. Our use of a maximin objective eliminates the 
rising part of the U-
truncated Pareto distribution. Ireland does not discuss any other distributions. He does not compute 
numerical solutions in the case with income effects. In Ireland’s model status does not affect the 
endpoint results. Further, there is little empirical support for the Ireland formulation of status, which 
was not zero- sum.  
Thus our paper supports the conclusion in the literature that relativity leads to higher marginal tax 
rates. It both generalizes some of the conditions under which this result is obtained in the literature, 
and fleshes out the detailed structure for optimal marginal tax rates for specific functional forms of 
distribution, utility function, and social welfare function. By and large, we find support for greater 
progressivity, as we define it, in the tax structure as relativity concern increases. And none of the 
papers in the literature, to our knowledge, high
d
d
function. More work is needed to f
th
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Table 1    
       Rawlsian  marginal tax rates (%) when people care about relative consumption     
    
                            є =1/3 
 
  є =1/3 
 
є=1/2 
 
є=1/2 
 
є=1 
 
є=1 
 
Relative 
concern 
a=2 a=3 a=2 a=3 a=2 a=3 
φ=0 66.6 57 60 50 50 40 
φ =1/2 83.3 78.6 80 75 75 70 
 
 
 Table 2 
 Rawlsian  marginal tax rates (%) with the Champernowne distribution  
 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1 є=1 є=1 є=1 
 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 
F(n) θ=2 θ=2 θ=3 θ=3 θ=2 θ=2 θ=3 θ=3 
0.10 94.7 97.2 93.3 96.4 89.2 94.6 86.7 93.4 
0.20 91.5 95.6 85.9 92.5 83.2 91.6 73.8 86.9 
0.50 81.2 90.0 74.1 86.3 66.6 83.3 56.9 78.4 
0.75 79.8 86.3 66.1 82.1 56.9 78.4 47.4 73.7 
0.90 70.4 84.3 61.4 79.8 52.3 76.2 42.3 71.2 
0.95 69.2 83.7 60.0 79.1 50.9 75.5 41.0 70.5 
0.99 67.0 82.6 58.2 78.1 48.4 74.2 39.5 69.5 
0.999 58.7 78.4 52.2 75.1 39.9 69.2 33.5 66.8 
 
 
                                     Table 3 
 Rawlsian  marginal tax rates (%) with the lognormal distribution   
 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1/3 є=1 є=1 є=1 є=1 
 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 φ=0 φ=1/2 
F(n) σ=0.7 σ=0.7 σ=0.39 σ=0.39 σ=0.7 σ=0.7 σ=0.39 σ=0.39 
0.10 93.4 96.7 89.4 94.7 87.8 93.9 80.8 90.4 
0.20 87.6 93.8 79.1 89.6 78.0 89.0 65.5 82.7 
0.50 77.7 88.9 65.9 82.9 63.6 81.8 49.1 74.6 
0.75 68.2 84.1 55.0 77.5 51.7 75.8 37.9 68.9 
0.90 61.5 80.7 46.9 73.5 44.4 72.2 30.7 65.9 
0.95 59.5 78.7 43.8 71.9 30.2 71.1 28.1 64.0 
0.99 51.7 75.8 36.9 68.5 34.9 67.4 22.6 61.3 
0.999 47.5 73.8 31.7 65.9 31.1 65.6 18.8 59.4 
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Table 4 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =0     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Ec Eu 
0.10 0.32 0.06 0.09  -50 30 1.06 0.56 
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.15  -4 29 0.72 0.22 
0.90 0.46 0.32 0.28   13 26 0.59 0.09 
0.99 0.48 0.57 0.47   18 23 0.54 0.04 
P(90/10)  5.33 3.11     
RD%   41.7     
F(no)=0.0003,  x(n0)=0.05,  x(n0)/x(median)=0.33 
Table 5 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.22 0.04 0.13  -202 58 2.03 2.36 
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.17  -14 60 0.67 0.95 
0.90 0.53 0.37 0.26   30 61 0.26 0.59 
0.99 0.59 0.68 0.38   44 60 0.13 0.46 
P(90/10)  9.25 2.0     
RD%   78.4     
F(no)=0.015,  x(n0)=0.11, x(n0)/x(median)=0.65 
Table 6 
β= 0 σ=0.7 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.12 0.01 0.001 0.13      - 61   
0.50 0.34 0.14 0.17    -38 65 0.96 1.29 
0.90 0.51 0.48 0.28     39 68 0.31 0.64 
0.99 0.60 1.06 0.48     55 67 0.11 0.44 
P(90/50)  3.4 1.64     
RD%   51.8     
F(no)=0.12,   x(n0)=0.125, x(n0)/x(median)=0.7 
 25
 
Table 7 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ=3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.11 0.02 0.15  -643 78   
0.50 0.41 0.15 0.18    -20 79 0.95 1.15 
0.90 0.58 0.40 0.23     42 80 0.38 0.58 
0.99 0.66 0.76 0.30     60 81 0.21 0.41 
P(90/50)  2.66 1.66     
RD%   37.6     
F(no)=0.07,    x(n0)=0.14,  x(n0)/x(median)=0.78 
 
 
Table 8 
β= 0 σ=0.7 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.22 0.01 0.001 0.16       - 81   
0.50 0.30 0.11 0.18    -64 82 1,66  1.86 
0.90 0.56 0.50 0.25     51 84 0.42 0.63 
0.99 0.67 1.21 0.36     71 85 0.19 0.39 
P(90/50)  4.54 1.56     
RD%   66.0    
F(no)=0.22,  x(n0)=0.16, x(n0)/x(median)=0.89 
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Table 9  Champernowne distribution 
β= 0 θ=3 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.12 0.01 0.002 0.16       - 79   
0.50 0.37 0.14 0.18    -33 80 1.06 1.36 
0.90 0.55 0.42 0.24     44 83 0.45 0.65 
0.99 0.65 1.06 0.34     68 85 0.23 0.43 
P(90/50)  2.8 1.33     
RD%   52.5    
F(no)=0.117 , x(n0)=0.155, x(n0)/x(median)=0.86 
Table 10  Champernowne distribution 
β= 0 θ=2 R= 0.0  φ =3     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.38 0.01 0.001 0.18       - 84   
0.50 0.15 0.06 0.19    -228 85  4.32 4.52 
0.90 0.51 0.56 0.25     55 88 0.57 0.77 
0.99 0.69 1.06 0.44     69 90 0.16 0.36 
P(90/50)  9.33 1.32     
RD%    85    
F(no)=0.38,  x(n0)=0.178, x(n0)/x(median)=0.93 
Table 11 Non-welfarism 
β= 0 σ=0.5 R= 0.0 φ =1     
F(n) y z x ATR% MTR% Eu Ec 
0.10 0.33 0.06 0.09  -202 58 1.02 1.35 
0.50 0.42 0.15 0.16  -14 60 0.59 0.92 
0.90 0.46 0.32 0.29   30 61 0.45 0.78 
0.99 0.49 0.57 0.48   44 60 0.36 0.69 
P(90/10)  5.33 3.22     
RD%   39.7     
F(no)=0.01,  x(n0)=0.09, x(n0)/x(median)=0.56 
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Figure 1a     (1-F(n)/nf(n):  Champernowne distribution  
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Figure 1 b    (1-F(n)/nf(n):  Lognormal distribution 
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Figure 2 (σ=0.5) 
Marginal tax rate curves 
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Figure 3 (φ=1) 
Marginal tax rate curves 
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Figure 4 (φ=3) 
Marginal tax rate curves 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
F(n)
M
TR
% sigma=0,7
sigma =0,5
 
 
 
Figure 5 (σ=0.5) 
Marginal tax rate curves 
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Figure 6 (σ=0.7) 
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Figure 7 Marginal tax  rates β=0 , R=0.0 (X/Z=1) f(n)= lognormal(-1.0,0.5) 
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Figure 8  Marginal tax rates    β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0 ,0.7) 
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Figure 9  Marginal tax rates    β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1.0) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0 ,0.5) 
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Figure 10  Labour supply (0-100)  , β=1, R=0.0 (X/Z=1.0) f(n)=lognormal (-1.0,0.5) 
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